Brazil’s Peacekeeping Force was established to ensure law
and order in communities or slums, and it is comprised of men and women,
including military members of the Brazilian Army, Military Police, and Civil
Police of Rio de Janeiro. According to police records, the military presence in
the areas of operation resulted in a significant decrease in crime rates.
In November 2010, the Peacekeeping Force occupied a 10-mile
perimeter of an extremely rough territory cut horizontally by the Serra da
Misericórdia mountain range that the Comando Vermelho criminal group used to
execute those who did not collaborate with them. The Complexo do Alemão favela
is located on the southern part of the mountain and the Complexo da Penha to
the north, with an estimated 400,000 residents in the mazes of both slums.
Because the occupation was performed in a state of
constitutional normalcy, with full exercise of rights and individual
guarantees, telephone tapping of any kind was not authorized. This limitation
restricted the use of electronic warfare to monitoring and listening only with
devices such as two-way open-signal and unencrypted radios.
Still, as the maintenance of this communication system was
cheap and the logistics very simple, the monitoring of this communication
network was valuable. The activities of clandestine communications by the
Comando Vermelho at the Complexo do Alemão and Complexo da Penha favelas used
tactical techniques and procedures typical of an irregular war, characterizing
an asymmetric war conflict in the heart of Rio de Janeiro.
The purpose of using electronic warfare is to employ
military electronics in the field, using actions that will reduce or eliminate
the efficiency or the use of electromagnetic spectrum by adverse forces and to
ensure the efficiency of the use of that spectrum by the friendly forces.
However, in previous decades of last century, electronic
warfare operations became part of military operations.
Besides the specialized monitoring of the signal
transmissions, the Army Peacekeeping Force would interfere in the Comando
Vermelho’s radio network whenever it was convenient, to reduce the capability
of the command and control by their leaders through weakening or even completely
silencing their communication system via radio during critical moments. The
transmission of false messages was not explored by the troops; however, strong
indications lead to the conclusion that on some occasions the criminals
identified the monitoring and intentionally transmitted false information. For
instance, one of them pretended to be transporting a stolen rifle from the
Peacekeeping Force. Thanks to the absolute control of the weaponry, it was
quickly verified that it was a false message.
Initially, electronic warfare activities were conducted by
specialized military members in close connection with intelligence. After some
time, a military troop was kept within the same facility to direct the Soldiers
who were in the territory in real time, thereby improving their actions. This
procedure created excellent results because it took advantage of the
opportunities available, even though it was neglecting the evaluation of an
intelligence analyst, because the integration was linked to human intelligence.
During the first seven months, electronic warfare was not
used because the security of the available equipment could not be guaranteed.
At that opportunity, various antennas would occupy a 295-foot extension at the
top of Serra da Misericórdia. Only after acquiring more compact equipment it
became possible to secretly install them inside highly restricted areas of
operations of facilities permanently occupied by the troops.
Three pieces of equipment were installed to allow
triangulation and to precisely aim at the transmission locations. The sergeant
major and sergeant teams collected the information and the analyst officers
analyzed the recorded material to offer solutions to integrate the signal
intelligence.
It is important to emphasize that the signal intelligence
was only maximized once it became integrated with other intelligence sources to
strengthen the idea that has already been brought up, for instance, by human
intelligence, or to open a way for human intelligence to seek more data.
The use of signal intelligence resulted in several outcomes:
• Identification of the use of BTB (Blind Transmission
Broadcasting) type clandestine messages; normally the activities of the radio
network were closed immediately after the transmission of a recording from the
invasion of the Complexo da Penha favela, normally around midnight;
• Identification of the frequencies used by the scouts and
sentinels
• Picking up signs used and their respective location;
• Picking up slang and pre-established messages used to
disguise the activities that should not be transmitted openly;
• Identification of the presence of a controller and
regulator in the transmission networks;
• Identification of the schedules and locations of the main
points of drug trade (early evening and early morning hours);
• Investigation on the existence of a service scale to
observe the movement of the troops and for the drug trade;
• Identification of the existence of a preparation and meal
delivery service to the observers (led by the collaborating residents);
• Identification of the existence of a communications
security system;
• Identification that only the lowest level of drug
trafficking hierarchy used the two-way radio system;
The integration of electronic warfare activities, the
hotline and the patrols on foot (human intelligence) were the major sources of
information that contributed to the mapping of the locations of the highest
crime rate and for the color-coding of the area of operations in green, yellow,
and red.
In order to improve troop efficiency in the territory,
two-way radios with headphones were purchased for the patrol commanders. This
radio, which was simple to purchase and replace, created the opportunity for
many caught-in-the-act arrests.
The unprecedented use of this technique increased the
capabilities of the infantry troops to act in the territory, optimized
intelligence analysis and deserves further study to identify the opportunities
for improvement on future operations within urban limits.
*Fernando Montenegro is a Brazilian Army Retired Colonel, of
Special Forces, Commands, and Paratroopers, specialized in Counter-terrorism,
and twice commander of the Light Infantry Battalion Task Force
No comments:
Post a Comment